By ideal it is meant that a thing is something quite different from the palpable form of the thing
in which it is represented. This things represents a definite form of labour, a definite form of human objective activity, that is to say, the transformation of nature by social man (Ilyenkov, 1977: 86).
Some excerpts may help us to clarify the concept of ideal:
The ideal form is a form of a thing, but a form that is outside the thing, and is to be found in man as a form of his dynamic life activity, as goals and needs. Or conversely, it is a form of man’s life activity, but outside man, in the form of the thing he creates. “Ideality” as such exists only in the constant succession and replacement of these two forms of its “external embodiment” and does not coincide with either of them taken separately. It exists only through the unceasing process of the transformation of the form of activity – into the form of a thing and back – the form of a thing into the form of activity (of social man, of course). (page 98)
It is here that we find the answer to the riddle of “ideality”. Ideality, according to Marx, is nothing else but the form of social human activity represented in the thing. Or, conversely, the form of human activity represented as a thing, as an object.(p.86)
“Ideality” is a kind of stamp impressed on the substance of nature by social human life activity, a form of the functioning of the physical thing in the process of this activity. So all the things involved in the social process acquire a new “form of existence” that is not included in their physical nature and differs from it completely – their ideal form. (p.86)
“Ideality” is a category inseparably linked with the notion that human culture, human life activity is purposeful and, therefore, includes the activity of the human brain, consciousness and will. This is axiomatic and Marx, when contrasting his position regarding the “ideal” to Hegel’s view, writes that the ideal is “nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought”
We could say that the ideal should be objective in the meaning that it exists outside human brain. It exist in everyday activities. The value of money does not exist outside human activity (e.g.: travel with different money and it loose its value).
in which it is represented. This things represents a definite form of labour, a definite form of human objective activity, that is to say, the transformation of nature by social man (Ilyenkov, 1977: 86).
Some excerpts may help us to clarify the concept of ideal:
The ideal form is a form of a thing, but a form that is outside the thing, and is to be found in man as a form of his dynamic life activity, as goals and needs. Or conversely, it is a form of man’s life activity, but outside man, in the form of the thing he creates. “Ideality” as such exists only in the constant succession and replacement of these two forms of its “external embodiment” and does not coincide with either of them taken separately. It exists only through the unceasing process of the transformation of the form of activity – into the form of a thing and back – the form of a thing into the form of activity (of social man, of course). (page 98)
It is here that we find the answer to the riddle of “ideality”. Ideality, according to Marx, is nothing else but the form of social human activity represented in the thing. Or, conversely, the form of human activity represented as a thing, as an object.(p.86)
“Ideality” is a kind of stamp impressed on the substance of nature by social human life activity, a form of the functioning of the physical thing in the process of this activity. So all the things involved in the social process acquire a new “form of existence” that is not included in their physical nature and differs from it completely – their ideal form. (p.86)
“Ideality” is a category inseparably linked with the notion that human culture, human life activity is purposeful and, therefore, includes the activity of the human brain, consciousness and will. This is axiomatic and Marx, when contrasting his position regarding the “ideal” to Hegel’s view, writes that the ideal is “nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought”
We could say that the ideal should be objective in the meaning that it exists outside human brain. It exist in everyday activities. The value of money does not exist outside human activity (e.g.: travel with different money and it loose its value).
The ideal (e.g.: value) should be objetified in an object (e.g.: gold) which meaning (or significance) so that it can play a function in human activity.
•The objectification of the ideal is extremely important for transfering and maintaining the ideal relatively indepedent of human activity, and the materialization of the ideal in artifacts is what gives us the fetish that the ideal can exist without human activity.
•The objectification of the ideal is extremely important for transfering and maintaining the ideal relatively indepedent of human activity, and the materialization of the ideal in artifacts is what gives us the fetish that the ideal can exist without human activity.
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