Ilyenkov (1974:p. 256) points out that: "All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual, i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance."
Ilyenkov proposes that ideal aspect of things emerge from the process of labour/production in which man transforms nature.
Monday, January 16, 2012
8) How to investigate concepts in Dialectical Logic?
Ilyenkov (1974: 188) points out: "Thought had obviously to be investigated as collective, co-operative activity in the course of which the individual, with his schemas of conscious thinking, performed only partial functions....
Hegel, however, saw the main job facing logic after the work of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, as precisely in finding, bringing out, and indicating to thought, the means of intelligently and concretely resolving the contradictions into which it inevitably fell when consciously guided by the traditional, purely formal logic. That, too, was the real distinction between Hegel’s conception of thought and logic and all preceding ones.
...(p.190)
Dialectics, according to Hegel, was the form (or method or schema) of thought that included the process both of elucidating contradictions and of concretely resolving them in the corpus of a higher and more profound stage of rational understanding of the same object, on the way toward further investigation of the essence of the matter, i.e. in the course of developing science, engineering, and ‘morality’, and all the spheres he called the ‘objective spirit’.
Hegel, however, saw the main job facing logic after the work of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, as precisely in finding, bringing out, and indicating to thought, the means of intelligently and concretely resolving the contradictions into which it inevitably fell when consciously guided by the traditional, purely formal logic. That, too, was the real distinction between Hegel’s conception of thought and logic and all preceding ones.
...(p.190)
Dialectics, according to Hegel, was the form (or method or schema) of thought that included the process both of elucidating contradictions and of concretely resolving them in the corpus of a higher and more profound stage of rational understanding of the same object, on the way toward further investigation of the essence of the matter, i.e. in the course of developing science, engineering, and ‘morality’, and all the spheres he called the ‘objective spirit’.
What is the difference between "concepts" in formal logic and concepts in dialectical Logic?
Ilyenkov (1974: 183 - 184) points out that: "the old logic considered every kind of idea or notion whatsoever, insofar as it was expressed in speech or in a term, that is to say, the image of intuition or contemplation held in consciousness by means of speech, which recorded it. As a result, too, the old logic embraced the concept itself only from the aspect from which it was really not distinguished in any way from any notion or intuitive image expressed in speech, from the aspect of the abstract and general, which was really just as common to the concept as to the notion. Thus it came about that it took the form of abstract identity or abstract universality for the specific form of the concept, and could therefore only raise the law of identity and the principle of contradiction in determinations to the rank of absolute, fundamental criteria of the thought-form in general.
Kant also took that stand, understanding by concept any general notion insofar as it was fixed by a term. Hence his definition: ‘The concept is... a general image or representation of that which is common to many objects, consequently a general idea, provided that it can be included in several objects.’
The concept of concept in Dialectical Logic aims to represent the understanding of the essence of the matter, as explained by Ilyenkov: Hegel himself required a more profound solution of the problem of the concept and of thinking in concepts from logic. For him a concept was primarily a synonym for realunderstanding of the essence of the matter and not simply an expression of something general, of some identity of the objects of intuition. A concept disclosed the real nature of a thing and not its similarity with other things; and not only should it express the abstract generality of its object (that was only one of the moments of a concept, relating it to notion), but also the special nature or peculiarity of the object.
Hegel distinguished clearly between universality, which dialectically contained the whole richness of the particular and the singular within itself and in its determinations, and the simple abstract generality, identicalness, of all the single objects of a given kind. The universal concept expressed itself the actual law of the origin, development, and fading or disappearance of single things. And that was already quite another angle on the concept, much truer and deeper, because, as Hegel demonstrated with a mass of examples, the real law (the immanent nature of the single thing) did not always appear on the surface of phenomena in the form of a simple identicalness, of a common sign or attribute, or in the form of identity. If that were so there would be no need for any theoretical science. The job of thought was not limited to empirically registering common attributes.
Kant also took that stand, understanding by concept any general notion insofar as it was fixed by a term. Hence his definition: ‘The concept is... a general image or representation of that which is common to many objects, consequently a general idea, provided that it can be included in several objects.’
The concept of concept in Dialectical Logic aims to represent the understanding of the essence of the matter, as explained by Ilyenkov: Hegel himself required a more profound solution of the problem of the concept and of thinking in concepts from logic. For him a concept was primarily a synonym for realunderstanding of the essence of the matter and not simply an expression of something general, of some identity of the objects of intuition. A concept disclosed the real nature of a thing and not its similarity with other things; and not only should it express the abstract generality of its object (that was only one of the moments of a concept, relating it to notion), but also the special nature or peculiarity of the object.
Hegel distinguished clearly between universality, which dialectically contained the whole richness of the particular and the singular within itself and in its determinations, and the simple abstract generality, identicalness, of all the single objects of a given kind. The universal concept expressed itself the actual law of the origin, development, and fading or disappearance of single things. And that was already quite another angle on the concept, much truer and deeper, because, as Hegel demonstrated with a mass of examples, the real law (the immanent nature of the single thing) did not always appear on the surface of phenomena in the form of a simple identicalness, of a common sign or attribute, or in the form of identity. If that were so there would be no need for any theoretical science. The job of thought was not limited to empirically registering common attributes.
Thursday, January 12, 2012
3) What objective and material forms can the ideal assume?
According to Ilyenkov, the ideal has to be materialized and objectified in order to be transmitted and developed. Some examples are: grammar, laws, books and so on.
The ideal forms of the world are, according to Hegel, forms of activity realised in some material. If they are not realised in some palpable material, they remain invisible and unknown for the active spirit itself, the spirit cannot become aware of them. In order to examine them they must be “reified”, that is, turned into the forms and relations of things. Only in this case does ideality exist, does it possess present being; only as a reified and reifiable form of activity, a form of activity that has become and is becoming the form of an object, a palpable thing outside consciousness, and in no case as a transcendental-psychological pattern of consciousness, not as the internal pattern of the “self”, distinguishing itself from itself within itself, as it turned out with the “Fichtean philosopher” (Ilyenkov, 1977: 88).
“Ideality mainly characterises the idea or image insofar as they, becoming objectivised in words” [entering into the system of socially evolved knowledge which for the individual is something that is given for him. – E.V.I.], “in objective reality, thus acquire a relative independence, separating themselves, as it were, from the mental activity of the individual,” writes the Soviet psychologist S. L. Rubinstein.(Ilyenkov, 1977:79)
Ilyenkov argues that "the image is objectivised not only in words, and may enter into the system of socially evolved knowledge not only in its verbal expression. The image is objectivised just as well (and even more directly) in sculptural, graphic and plastic forms and in the form of the routine-ritual ways of dealing with things and people, so that it is expressed not only in words, in speech and language, but also in drawings, models and such symbolic objects as coats of arms, banners, dress, utensils, or as money, including gold coins and paper money, IOUs, bonds or credit notes." (Ilyenkov, 1977:79)
Hegel proceed (accroding to Ilyenkov, 1977: 81) proposing the the ideal "confronts the individual as the thought of preceding generations realised (“reified”, “objectified”, “alienated”) in sensuously perceptible “matter” – in language and visually perceptible images, in books and statues, in wood and bronze, in the form of places of worship and instruments of labour, in the designs of machines and state buildings, in the patterns of scientific and moral systems, and so on. All these objects are in their existence, in their “present being” substantial, “material”, but in their essence, in their origin they are “ideal”, because they “embody” the collective thinking of people, the “universal spirit” of mankind."
The ideal forms of the world are, according to Hegel, forms of activity realised in some material. If they are not realised in some palpable material, they remain invisible and unknown for the active spirit itself, the spirit cannot become aware of them. In order to examine them they must be “reified”, that is, turned into the forms and relations of things. Only in this case does ideality exist, does it possess present being; only as a reified and reifiable form of activity, a form of activity that has become and is becoming the form of an object, a palpable thing outside consciousness, and in no case as a transcendental-psychological pattern of consciousness, not as the internal pattern of the “self”, distinguishing itself from itself within itself, as it turned out with the “Fichtean philosopher” (Ilyenkov, 1977: 88).
“Ideality mainly characterises the idea or image insofar as they, becoming objectivised in words” [entering into the system of socially evolved knowledge which for the individual is something that is given for him. – E.V.I.], “in objective reality, thus acquire a relative independence, separating themselves, as it were, from the mental activity of the individual,” writes the Soviet psychologist S. L. Rubinstein.(Ilyenkov, 1977:79)
Ilyenkov argues that "the image is objectivised not only in words, and may enter into the system of socially evolved knowledge not only in its verbal expression. The image is objectivised just as well (and even more directly) in sculptural, graphic and plastic forms and in the form of the routine-ritual ways of dealing with things and people, so that it is expressed not only in words, in speech and language, but also in drawings, models and such symbolic objects as coats of arms, banners, dress, utensils, or as money, including gold coins and paper money, IOUs, bonds or credit notes." (Ilyenkov, 1977:79)
Hegel proceed (accroding to Ilyenkov, 1977: 81) proposing the the ideal "confronts the individual as the thought of preceding generations realised (“reified”, “objectified”, “alienated”) in sensuously perceptible “matter” – in language and visually perceptible images, in books and statues, in wood and bronze, in the form of places of worship and instruments of labour, in the designs of machines and state buildings, in the patterns of scientific and moral systems, and so on. All these objects are in their existence, in their “present being” substantial, “material”, but in their essence, in their origin they are “ideal”, because they “embody” the collective thinking of people, the “universal spirit” of mankind."
4) What is the difference between Kant, Hegel and Marx's view of ideal?
Kant "is defining space and time and speaking of their “transcendental ideality”. This means that “things” possess space-time determinacy only in the consciousness and thanks to the consciousness, but not in themselves, outside and before their appearance in the consciousness. Here “ideality” is clearly understood as a synonym for the “pure” and the a priori nature of consciousness as such, with no external connections. Kant attaches no other meaning to the term “ideality”.
Kant's could not overcome the notion of "social consciousness" as many times repeated individual consciousness. The social consciousness showed to oppose the individual, who assimilates it during his life and to which he summited his own will. An individual as unit of analysis does not solve the duality between between internal and external. In this view, culture becomes an external factor imposing what individuals should do, and it remains unexplained.
Hegel sees advantage (Ilyenkov, 1977: 77) in Plato who does not see ideal as something inside human mind but rather should be seen as social-collective world of ideas. Plato sees " the world of ideas (he, in fact, gives us the concept of the “ideal world”) as a stable and internally organised world of laws, rules and patterns controlling the individual’s mental activity" (Ilyenkov, 1977).
Plato's definition of world of ideas is (Ilyenkov 1997: 78): "a stable and internally organised world of laws, rules and patterns controlling the individual’s mental activity, the “individual soul”, as a special, supernatural “objective reality” standing in opposition to every individual and imperatively dictating to the individual how he should act in any given situation."
Plato acknowledge "the dependence of the mental (and not only mental) activity of the individual on the system of culture established before him and completely independently of him, a system in which the “spiritual life” of every individual begins and runs its course."
The duality between individual conscious versus everything else (in Kant) is replaced by a duality between the world of ideas versus world of things (by Plato).
Hegel goes a step further explaining that the ideal, materialized in language, rituals, customs, rights and so on; refers to the role and meaning of things in social human culture, in the context of socially organized human activity, and not in individual consciousness as proposed by Kant.
According to Hegel, it is through the assimilation of the ideal (human culture) that man become conscious of himself (he becomes human). Hegel contribution to the concept of ideal is that he includes the social organized experience/culture, seen as stable, historically cristalized in patterns, standards, and so on.
Another contribution of Hegel to the concept of ideal was in acknowledging that (Ilyenkov, 1977: 84):
"This relationship of representation is a relationship in which one sensuously perceived thing performs the role or function of representative of quite another thing, and, to be even more precise, the universal nature of that other thing, that is, something “other” which in sensuous, bodily terms is quite unlike it, and it was this relationship that in the Hegelian terminological tradition acquired the title of “ideality”.
The key limitation of Kant, Plato, Hegel is that they do not acknowledge the real world, independent of human experience, and before being expressed in human experience. For them, an "ideal" world is the world that is already assimilated a world already shaped by their activity, the world that people know. They can not explain how new concepts emerge (Ilyenkov, 1977: 82).Hegel does not talk about nature as it is, but nature as it is interpreted by man in the system of definitions established by its historically formed "language". Hegel does not recognize that when he talks about nature he is using the knowledge produced by human (natural science) and therefore it is limited to what we have already experienced.
Marx follows Hegel concept of ideal by making the differentiation between the representation of a thing and the thing that is aimed to represent. However, it is important to point out that the meaning of the concept of o ideal for Marx is the opposite than for Hegel. For Marx and Hegel something is ideal because its form does not consist in the corporeal palpable characteristics of the thing, but as a representation of another thing.
Marx goes a step further proposing that (Ilyenkov, 1977: 86): "Ideality, according to Marx, is nothing else but the form of social human activity represented in the thing. Or, conversely, the form of human activity represented as a thing, as an object." “Ideality” is a kind of stamp impressed on the substance of nature by social human life activity, a form of the functioning of the physical thing in the process of this activity. So all the things involved in the social process acquire a new “form of existence” that is not included in their physical nature and differs from it completely – their ideal form.
Kant's could not overcome the notion of "social consciousness" as many times repeated individual consciousness. The social consciousness showed to oppose the individual, who assimilates it during his life and to which he summited his own will. An individual as unit of analysis does not solve the duality between between internal and external. In this view, culture becomes an external factor imposing what individuals should do, and it remains unexplained.
Hegel sees advantage (Ilyenkov, 1977: 77) in Plato who does not see ideal as something inside human mind but rather should be seen as social-collective world of ideas. Plato sees " the world of ideas (he, in fact, gives us the concept of the “ideal world”) as a stable and internally organised world of laws, rules and patterns controlling the individual’s mental activity" (Ilyenkov, 1977).
Plato's definition of world of ideas is (Ilyenkov 1997: 78): "a stable and internally organised world of laws, rules and patterns controlling the individual’s mental activity, the “individual soul”, as a special, supernatural “objective reality” standing in opposition to every individual and imperatively dictating to the individual how he should act in any given situation."
Plato acknowledge "the dependence of the mental (and not only mental) activity of the individual on the system of culture established before him and completely independently of him, a system in which the “spiritual life” of every individual begins and runs its course."
The duality between individual conscious versus everything else (in Kant) is replaced by a duality between the world of ideas versus world of things (by Plato).
Hegel goes a step further explaining that the ideal, materialized in language, rituals, customs, rights and so on; refers to the role and meaning of things in social human culture, in the context of socially organized human activity, and not in individual consciousness as proposed by Kant.
According to Hegel, it is through the assimilation of the ideal (human culture) that man become conscious of himself (he becomes human). Hegel contribution to the concept of ideal is that he includes the social organized experience/culture, seen as stable, historically cristalized in patterns, standards, and so on.
Another contribution of Hegel to the concept of ideal was in acknowledging that (Ilyenkov, 1977: 84):
"This relationship of representation is a relationship in which one sensuously perceived thing performs the role or function of representative of quite another thing, and, to be even more precise, the universal nature of that other thing, that is, something “other” which in sensuous, bodily terms is quite unlike it, and it was this relationship that in the Hegelian terminological tradition acquired the title of “ideality”.
The key limitation of Kant, Plato, Hegel is that they do not acknowledge the real world, independent of human experience, and before being expressed in human experience. For them, an "ideal" world is the world that is already assimilated a world already shaped by their activity, the world that people know. They can not explain how new concepts emerge (Ilyenkov, 1977: 82).Hegel does not talk about nature as it is, but nature as it is interpreted by man in the system of definitions established by its historically formed "language". Hegel does not recognize that when he talks about nature he is using the knowledge produced by human (natural science) and therefore it is limited to what we have already experienced.
Marx follows Hegel concept of ideal by making the differentiation between the representation of a thing and the thing that is aimed to represent. However, it is important to point out that the meaning of the concept of o ideal for Marx is the opposite than for Hegel. For Marx and Hegel something is ideal because its form does not consist in the corporeal palpable characteristics of the thing, but as a representation of another thing.
Marx goes a step further proposing that (Ilyenkov, 1977: 86): "Ideality, according to Marx, is nothing else but the form of social human activity represented in the thing. Or, conversely, the form of human activity represented as a thing, as an object." “Ideality” is a kind of stamp impressed on the substance of nature by social human life activity, a form of the functioning of the physical thing in the process of this activity. So all the things involved in the social process acquire a new “form of existence” that is not included in their physical nature and differs from it completely – their ideal form.
5) What is the relationship between the ideal and to consciousness and will?
This question can be answer with the quote from Ilyenkov (1977: 86):
"both will and consciousness are determined by this objective ideal form, and the thing that it expresses, “represents” is a definite social relationship between people which in their eyes assumes the fantastic form of a relationship between things.
"In other words, what is “represented” here as a thing is the form of people’s activity, the form of life activity which they perform together, which has taken shape “behind the back of consciousness” and is materially established in the form of the relationship between things described above."
Ilyenkov continues explaining that:" The consciousness and will that arise in the mind of the human individual are the direct consequence of the fact that what he is confronted by as the object of his life activity is not nature as such, but nature that has been transformed by the labour of previous generations, shaped by human labour, nature in the forms of human life activity."(page 94)
"both will and consciousness are determined by this objective ideal form, and the thing that it expresses, “represents” is a definite social relationship between people which in their eyes assumes the fantastic form of a relationship between things.
"In other words, what is “represented” here as a thing is the form of people’s activity, the form of life activity which they perform together, which has taken shape “behind the back of consciousness” and is materially established in the form of the relationship between things described above."
Ilyenkov continues explaining that:" The consciousness and will that arise in the mind of the human individual are the direct consequence of the fact that what he is confronted by as the object of his life activity is not nature as such, but nature that has been transformed by the labour of previous generations, shaped by human labour, nature in the forms of human life activity."(page 94)
Wednesday, January 11, 2012
2) How is the ideal formed?
"The ideal, as the form of social man’s activity, exists where the process of the transformation of the body of nature into the object of man’s activity, into the object of labour, and then into the product of labour, takes place. The same thing can be expressed in another way, as follows: the form of the external. thing involved in the labour process is ‘sublated’ in the subjective form of objective activity (action on objects); the latter is objectively registered in the subject in the form of the mechanisms of higher nervous activity; and then there is the reverse sequence of these metamorphoses, namely the verbally expressed idea is transformed into a deed, and through the deed into the form of an external, sensuously perceived thing, into a thing. These two contrary series of metamorphoses form a closed cycle: thing—deed—word—deed—thing. Only in this cyclic movement, constantly renewed, does the ideal, the ideal image of the thing exist.”
•The ideal is not pre or independent of human. Its origin is in human activity. It is through human activity that the the ideal is constructed and re-constructed.
•BUT, the fact that it can be materialized make it look as independent and determining (dominating) humans. We can dominate the ideal by being conscious that they are symbols (representations) of human activity.
1) What does Ilyenkov mean by ideal?
By ideal it is meant that a thing is something quite different from the palpable form of the thing
in which it is represented. This things represents a definite form of labour, a definite form of human objective activity, that is to say, the transformation of nature by social man (Ilyenkov, 1977: 86).
Some excerpts may help us to clarify the concept of ideal:
The ideal form is a form of a thing, but a form that is outside the thing, and is to be found in man as a form of his dynamic life activity, as goals and needs. Or conversely, it is a form of man’s life activity, but outside man, in the form of the thing he creates. “Ideality” as such exists only in the constant succession and replacement of these two forms of its “external embodiment” and does not coincide with either of them taken separately. It exists only through the unceasing process of the transformation of the form of activity – into the form of a thing and back – the form of a thing into the form of activity (of social man, of course). (page 98)
It is here that we find the answer to the riddle of “ideality”. Ideality, according to Marx, is nothing else but the form of social human activity represented in the thing. Or, conversely, the form of human activity represented as a thing, as an object.(p.86)
“Ideality” is a kind of stamp impressed on the substance of nature by social human life activity, a form of the functioning of the physical thing in the process of this activity. So all the things involved in the social process acquire a new “form of existence” that is not included in their physical nature and differs from it completely – their ideal form. (p.86)
“Ideality” is a category inseparably linked with the notion that human culture, human life activity is purposeful and, therefore, includes the activity of the human brain, consciousness and will. This is axiomatic and Marx, when contrasting his position regarding the “ideal” to Hegel’s view, writes that the ideal is “nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought”
We could say that the ideal should be objective in the meaning that it exists outside human brain. It exist in everyday activities. The value of money does not exist outside human activity (e.g.: travel with different money and it loose its value).
in which it is represented. This things represents a definite form of labour, a definite form of human objective activity, that is to say, the transformation of nature by social man (Ilyenkov, 1977: 86).
Some excerpts may help us to clarify the concept of ideal:
The ideal form is a form of a thing, but a form that is outside the thing, and is to be found in man as a form of his dynamic life activity, as goals and needs. Or conversely, it is a form of man’s life activity, but outside man, in the form of the thing he creates. “Ideality” as such exists only in the constant succession and replacement of these two forms of its “external embodiment” and does not coincide with either of them taken separately. It exists only through the unceasing process of the transformation of the form of activity – into the form of a thing and back – the form of a thing into the form of activity (of social man, of course). (page 98)
It is here that we find the answer to the riddle of “ideality”. Ideality, according to Marx, is nothing else but the form of social human activity represented in the thing. Or, conversely, the form of human activity represented as a thing, as an object.(p.86)
“Ideality” is a kind of stamp impressed on the substance of nature by social human life activity, a form of the functioning of the physical thing in the process of this activity. So all the things involved in the social process acquire a new “form of existence” that is not included in their physical nature and differs from it completely – their ideal form. (p.86)
“Ideality” is a category inseparably linked with the notion that human culture, human life activity is purposeful and, therefore, includes the activity of the human brain, consciousness and will. This is axiomatic and Marx, when contrasting his position regarding the “ideal” to Hegel’s view, writes that the ideal is “nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought”
We could say that the ideal should be objective in the meaning that it exists outside human brain. It exist in everyday activities. The value of money does not exist outside human activity (e.g.: travel with different money and it loose its value).
The ideal (e.g.: value) should be objetified in an object (e.g.: gold) which meaning (or significance) so that it can play a function in human activity.
•The objectification of the ideal is extremely important for transfering and maintaining the ideal relatively indepedent of human activity, and the materialization of the ideal in artifacts is what gives us the fetish that the ideal can exist without human activity.
•The objectification of the ideal is extremely important for transfering and maintaining the ideal relatively indepedent of human activity, and the materialization of the ideal in artifacts is what gives us the fetish that the ideal can exist without human activity.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)